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Abstract—This paper surveys blockchain-based approaches for
several security services. These services include authentication,
confidentiality, privacy and access control list, data and resource
provenance, and integrity assurance. All these services are crit-
ical for the current distributed applications, especially due to
the large amount of data being processed over the networks
and the use of cloud computing. Authentication ensures that
the user is who he/she claims to be. Confidentiality guarantees
that data cannot be read by unauthorized users. Privacy pro-
vides the users the ability to control who can access their data.
Provenance allows an efficient tracking of the data and resources
along with their ownership and utilization over the network.
Integrity helps in verifying that the data has not been modified
or altered. These services are currently managed by centralized
controllers, for example, a certificate authority. Therefore, the
services are prone to attacks on the centralized controller. On
the other hand, blockchain is a secured and distributed ledger
that can help resolve many of the problems with centraliza-
tion. The objectives of this paper are to give insights on the
use of security services for current applications, to highlight the
state of the art techniques that are currently used to provide
these services, to describe their challenges, and to discuss how
the blockchain technology can resolve these challenges. Further,
several blockchain-based approaches providing such security ser-
vices are compared thoroughly. Challenges associated with using
blockchain-based security services are also discussed to spur
further research in this area.
Index Terms—Blockchains, public key cryptography, prove-
nance, data privacy, access control list, integrity assurance,
blockchain challenges.
I. INTRODUCTION
A BLOCKCHAIN is a secured, shared and distributedledger that facilitates the process of recording and
tracking resources without the need of a centralized trusted
authority. It allows two parties to communicate and exchange
resources in a peer-to-peer network where distributed decisions
are made by the majority rather than by a single centralized
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authority. It is provably secure against attackers who try to
control the system by compromising the centralized controller.
Resources can be tangible (e.g., money, houses, cars, lands) or
intangible (e.g., copyrights, digital documents, and intellectual
property rights). In general, anything that has a value can be
tracked on a blockchain network to reduce its security risks
and save the cost of security monitoring for all involved [1].
Recently, the blockchain technology has attracted tremen-
dous interest from both academia and industry. The technology
started with Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that has reached a cap-
italization of 180 billion dollars as of January 2018 [2], [3].
According to the Gartner report in 2016, the blockchain
technology is receiving billions of dollars in research and
enterprise investments and much more is expected to come
in the near future [5]. The technology currently spans sev-
eral applications that are popular and driving the networking
research. Such applications include healthcare [6], Internet of
Things (IoT) [7], [8], and cloud storage [9]. Generally, the
blockchain technology has proven its potential in any appli-
cation that currently requires a centralized ledger. A practical
example that employs blockchains is the Interbank Information
Network provided by JP Morgan which provides fast, secured,
and cheap international payments [10]. In addition, supply
chain systems by IBM is exploring the potential of using
blockchains in their services [11].
Among the blockchains’ promising applications are network
monitoring and security services including authentication, con-
fidentiality, privacy, integrity, and provenance. Currently, these
services are provided by trusted third-party brokers or using
inefficient distributed approaches. As a result, security is
a major challenge for current applications. On the other hand,
the blockchain technology can provide security guarantees that
resolve many traditional challenges in addition to providing
a fully distributed, provably secure, and consensus solution.
Fig. 1 illustrates the differences between the traditional and
the blockchain-based access control. The same concept can
be applied to the other security guarantees.
This survey focuses on the use of the blockchain technol-
ogy to provide network security services and applications.
We present the use of these services in the current applica-
tions, discuss the conventional techniques that provide these
security services, and illustrate their challenges and prob-
lems. Then, we present how the blockchain technology can
be used to resolve the associated challenges and highlight
several proposed blockchain-based approaches that provide
the desired security services. Finally, we discuss the current
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Fig. 1. (a) Traditional centralized access control guarantees (b) Blockchain-
based access control guarantees.
challenges faced with blockchain and some of the potential
future research directions in this field. It should be noted that
the details of the blockchain technology and how it is used
in other domains are out of the scope of this paper. We refer
the readers to [1] and [2] for more details on the blockchain
technology.
A. Related Work
With the current growing interest in the blockchain technol-
ogy, many new platforms and applications have been proposed.
Several survey papers have been written to highlight the ben-
efits of this technology for the current applications. Examples
of such surveys include the blockchain technology for IoT [8],
healthcare [6] and decentralized digital currencies [12]. Other
surveys have discussed blockchain challenges, opportunities,
and future visions. For example, Lin and Liao [13] discuss the
blockchain security issues and challenges. The work in [14]
presents a thorough survey on blockchain security and pri-
vacy issues including possible attacks and countermeasures.
Moreover, a recent special issue of IEEE spectrum is dedicated
to blockchains and their potential uses [15].
This paper investigates the use of the blockchain technology
in a different set of applications with rising interests that have
not been discussed in the prior surveys. We aim to provide
a comprehensive survey on the use of the blockchain tech-
nology in security services. The services can be offered by
an enterprise and verified globally, offered by an enterprise
but not verified, or presented as a research work. We strive
these services to give insights on the current state-of-the-art
technology and its challenges and discuss how the blockchain
technology can be used to resolve these challenges.
B. Security Services and Mechanisms
According to the X.800 family of standards [16], security
services can be defined as the services that aid the open system
interconnection protocols in providing adequate security to the
transferred data over the system. These services can be divided
into six categories: authentication, data privacy, data integrity,
data confidentiality, non-repudiation and data provenance. The
authentication service includes data origin authentication and
entity authentication. The mechanisms to achieve this ser-
vice include encryption and digital signature schemes. These
mechanisms can be provided using public key cryptography,
which will be explained later in Section III. The data privacy
service can be achieved by access control mechanisms. The
data confidentiality service can also be obtained by encryp-
tion and; therefore, public key cryptography can be used. The
data integrity service can be achieved by message authentica-
tion codes using the secret key or the public key cryptography.
The integrity mechanisms include replicating of the data
and validating that replicas match. The non-repudiation ser-
vice assures that no one can deny his/her action later and
this can be provided using digital signature schemes; there-
fore, public key cryptography techniques can be employed.
Further, we add the data provenance as another service to
achieve tracking and monitoring of the data or resources.
Table I summarizes these security services and their associated
mechanisms.
In this paper, we consider the blockchain-based security ser-
vices. Therefore, our discussion will include services such as
authentication, data privacy, data integrity, and data confiden-
tiality. Authentication and confidentiality are both provided
by the public key cryptography; hence, these two will be
combined in the same section. Privacy and integrity will be
discussed in separate sections. It should be noted that non-
repudiation is already provided by blockchain as will be
explained later in Section II; therefore, we will not consider
it among the services discussed later in the paper.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
gives a brief background on the blockchain architecture and
its key properties and platforms. Section III discusses both the
traditional and the blockchain-based approaches in providing
authentication and encryption by public key cryptography and
key management techniques. Section IV describes both the
traditional and the blockchain-based approaches to provide pri-
vacy and access control lists (ACL). Section V presents both
the traditional and the blockchain-based approaches to pro-
vide provenance services that track and report the data and
resources shared in the network. Both the traditional and the
blockchain-based approaches for integrity services to check
for correctness and reliability of the data are discussed in
Section VI. Section VII focuses on the challenges currently
faced with the use of the blockchain technology and their
effect on security services. Finally, Section VIII summarizes
the discussion and highlights the main presented points.
II. BLOCKCHAIN BACKGROUND
In this section, a brief introduction to the blockchain tech-
nology is first presented. Following that, mining or block
construction techniques are explained. The appealing charac-
teristics of blockchains are also discussed along with a com-
parison of different open-source blockchain implementations.
The objective of this section is to introduce the readers to the
blockchain technology and its key principles.
A. Blockchain Architecture
A blockchain consists of a database and a network of
nodes, as illustrated in Fig. 2. A blockchain database is
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TABLE I
SECURITY SERVICES VERSUS SECURITY MECHANISMS
Fig. 2. Blockchain network, database, blocks, and transactions.
a shared, distributed, fault-tolerant and append-only database
that maintains the records in blocks. Although the blocks are
accessible by all the blockchain users, they cannot be deleted
or altered by them. The blocks are connected to each other
in a chain as each block has a hash value of its predecessor.
Each block contains several verified transactions. Also, each
block includes a timestamp indicating the creation time of
that block, and a random number (nonce) for cryptographic
operations. The blockchain network consists of nodes that
maintain the blockchain in a peer-to-peer, distributed fash-
ion. All nodes have access to the blocks, but they cannot
completely control them.
The blockchain technology allows the communicating par-
ties to interact in the absence of a trusted third-party. The
interactions are recorded in the blockchain database provid-
ing the desired security requirements. When a blockchain user
needs to interact with another user, it broadcasts its “transac-
tion” to the blockchain network. Several nodes in the network
check if the interactions are valid and construct a new block
of valid transactions by mining (i.e., combining several valid
transactions). The making of the blocks will be discussed fur-
ther in the next subsection. If the new block is found valid, it
is attached to the blockchain database and cannot be deleted
or altered later. Otherwise, the block is dropped. Both the
transactions and the blocks are signed; hence, they cannot be
reverted or denied in the future.
The blockchain technology has three generations that sup-
port money transactions, assets, and smart contracts, respec-
tively. The first generation was published by Satoshi Nakamoto
in 2009 [1]. The application of this generation was restricted
to money transactions and was implemented as a part of the
Bitcoin cryptocurrency, which was the first application uti-
lizing the blockchain concept. The second generation of the
blockchain technology had broader use cases that exchanged
assets rather than just money. In this generation, users own
“shares” or “assets” and they can exchange any type of assets,
including goods, properties and even votes [2]. In the third
generation of the blockchain, smart contracts were introduced.
A smart contract is a programmable contract that is checked
by everyone in the network; thus, it compels both communica-
tion parties to strictly follow the contracts. The capabilities of
blockchains were enhanced significantly within the third gen-
eration which led to its worldwide popularity and an increasing
interest in its applications for several other critical services [7].
B. Mining a Block in a Blockchain
Mining is the process of creating blocks that will be attached
to the database. In some of the blockchain applications, such
as in Bitcoin, the miner who creates the first valid block is
rewarded. This reward is given by the system and is generally
in terms of money for financial applications. Mining is one of
the critical concepts in the blockchain technology. It allows
nodes to create blocks which will be validated by others as
well. If the new block is found as valid, it is attached to the
blockchain database. Nodes that try to create blocks are called
“mining nodes.” The mining nodes race to validate the trans-
actions and create a new block as fast as they can to win the
reward.
Several approaches exist to decide which miner
wins, including proof of work (PoW) [17], proof of
Stake (PoS) [18], Proof of Space (PoSpace) [19], Proof
of Importance (PoI) [20], Measure of Trust (MoT) [21],
minimum block hash [22], and Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT) [23]. In the following, we summarize these
major mining approaches (see also Table II).
• Proof of Work: PoW is the mining technique used in
Bitcoin and is currently used by many other blockchain
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MINING TECHNIQUES
technologies. It requires the mining nodes to solve a hard-
mathematical puzzle that is changed frequently and has
been agreed by all the miners. Once a node validates
the transactions and solves the puzzle, the block is sub-
mitted to the blockchain network. Other mining nodes
validate the block to make sure that the submitter is not
falsifying. Once it is agreed among the miners that the
block is legit, it will be added to the blockchain and
the submitter will be rewarded. The agreement here is
based on a majority consensus. Thus, it is difficult to
fake unless the attackers compromise more than 50 per-
cent of the mining nodes. The problem with this approach
is that high computational power is wasted in solving the
mathematical puzzle [17].
• Proof of Stake: Unlike PoW, PoS does not require the
mining nodes to solve a computationally expensive math-
ematical puzzle. Instead, the next block creator or miner
is chosen in a pseudo-random way. The chance of a node
being chosen to create the new block depends on the
node’s wealth or stake. In other words, the more money
a node has, the higher its chances to mine a block. The
native version of PoS does not award the miner; however,
the extended versions award and punish the creators based
on their performance. Selection based on the wealthiest
account may result in a single account handling all the
creations; hence, it may lead to an unfair distribution or
even centralization. Therefore, a randomized node selec-
tion and a coin age-based selection have been proposed.
In coin age-based method, the users that have not cre-
ated any block for the past 30 days are considered for
mining [18].
• Proof of Space: PoSpace is similar to PoW except that
the puzzle requires a lot of storage. A miner proves its
ability to create a new block by allocating the required
storage space to perform mining. In other words, instead
of having a high computational capability, the mining
node needs to have a high storage capability. Several the-
oretical and practical implementations of PoSpace have
been released; however, the required high memory space
is a challenge similar to the computation challenge of
PoW [19].
• Proof of Importance: PoI is a mining technique that cal-
culates the significance of an individual node based on
the transaction amount and the balance of that node. It
assigns a priority with a hash calculation to the more sig-
nificant nodes. Further, the node with the highest priority
is chosen for the next block creation [20].
• Measure of Trust: Another way to perform mining is to
use dynamic trust measurements and select the node with
the highest trust level as the block initiator [21]. The
trustworthiness is based on the nodes’ behaviors; there-
fore, good behaving nodes that follow the protocols are
rewarded. More specifically, the trustworthiness could be
formulated as the expected value of the node’s behavior
in the future. This, the trustworthiness is approximated
by the history of good and bad actions that the node
has taken so far. The MoT approach could be subject to
malicious attacks if a specific node plans to increase its
trustworthiness for several iterations in order to attack
the network later. Zyskind et al. [21] proposed several
mechanisms to handle such attacks.
• Minimum Block Hash: Paul et al. [22] proposed an
approach for mining where the miner is chosen randomly
and not based on its resources. The system selects the
miners based on a generated minimum hash value across
the entire network. Thus, the selection of the next miner
is randomized and the probability of selecting the same
miner is low. This approach was implemented on a mod-
ified Bitcoin network and it was shown to offer energy
savings for mining. However, it has not been adopted by
the Bitcoin community.
• Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance: Unlike others,
PBFT [23] is a consensus approach that does not include
any type of resources but utilizes the blockchain con-
sensus based on the Byzantine fault tolerance approach.
In this approach, first, a leader is selected and agreed
among the nodes. The leader decides on the transac-
tions’ validation and publishes a block to all the nodes
in the blockchain network. A transaction is committed to
a new block only if two-thirds of the mining nodes verify
its correctness. The leader changes frequently; therefore,
the approach is not considered as centralized. PBFT has
been shown to be faster than other methods; however,
it suffers from scalability issues due to the resulting
communication overhead as discussed in [24].
C. Key Properties of Blockchains
Key properties of the blockchain technology include their
distributed nature, decentralized consensus, trustless system,
cryptographic security, and non-repudiation guarantees. In
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TABLE III
KEY PROPERTIES OF BLOCKCHAINS
Table III, we briefly summarize these properties and the
problems they try to solve.
D. Blockchain Open-Source Implementations
As there are many open-source implementations of the
blockchain technology, the choice of which implementation to
use is challenging. In Table IV, we compare different aspects
of several popular blockchain implementations. We will be
referring to these implementations throughout this paper when
we discuss the blockchain-based security services. It is impor-
tant to keep these features in mind to highlight the properties
of each implementation. It should be noted that these are not
the only implementations and many others exist in the liter-
ature. However, these are the most popular ones used in the
majority of the blockchain applications.
E. Summary
A blockchain is a distributed, shared, append-only, and
permanent database that was first utilized by Bitcoin for cryp-
tocurrency applications. Its key properties include distributed
TABLE IV
OPEN-SOURCE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF BLOCKCHAINS COMPARISON
nature, consensus, trustless system, cryptographic security
and non-repudiation guarantees. These properties make the
blockchain technology a potential approach for the current dis-
tributed applications including IoT, healthcare, and automated
supply chains. Several variations of the blockchain technology
exist in the literature to solve the challenges introduced in the
first generation. One of the critical challenges in Bitcoin min-
ing is the computational capability that is required to perform
mining. Alternatives to PoW mining include: PoS, PoSpace,
PoI, MoT, minimum block hash, and BPFT. These alterna-
tives resulted in many open-source blockchain platforms that
developers can choose depending on the application. In the
remainder of this paper, we assume that the reader has the
knowledge of the discussed platforms and their variations, as
well as the advantages, and disadvantages of each.
III. ENCRYPTION AND THE AUTHENTICATION SERVICES
Encryption and authentication are two of the most impor-
tant security services that must be provided in any network
system. In general, these services can be granted using public
key cryptography as one of the well-known security frame-
works. The public key cryptography techniques require the
entities to have private and public information. They need an
infrastructure to create, revoke, manage, distribute, use, and
store the generated keys or the generated information. In this
section, the public key cryptography and its uses in today’s
applications are first discussed. Following that, an introduction
to the public key management techniques and their challenges
are presented. Then, an overview of how the blockchains can
be used to solve these challenges and some blockchain-based
key management techniques are discussed and compared.
A. Public Key Cryptography and Its Services
Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryp-
tography, is a cryptographic technique that uses a pair of keys:
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Fig. 3. Illustration of public key services.
public keys which are distributed over the system and private
keys which are kept secret. It was introduced initially by Diffie
and Hellman in 1975 and is still widely adopted. The basic
idea is to use one of the keys to do a task (encryption or sig-
nature) and use the other key to do the reverse of that task
(decryption or validation). In this way, every entity can verify
the message coming from a certain user by the user’s public
key. The reply message can also be encrypted before sending
it back. Only that specific user can sign/decrypt the message
with its private key.
The public key cryptography can be used for many security
services including the entity authentication and the confiden-
tiality. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the entity authentication service
can be provided by the signature/verification procedure. An
entity sends a message signed with its private key and everyone
can verify/authenticate that entity by validating the signature
with the entity’s public key. Since the private key is kept confi-
dential, no one can sign the message except the entity itself or
someone who has access to the private key. On the other hand,
the verification is done with the public keys. Thus, everyone
with the user’s public information can verify and authenticate
that user.
The confidentiality service can be achieved by encryp-
tion/decryption, which is a similar procedure. The encryption
is done by the sender with the receiver’s public key. The
decryption is done by the receiver with his private key. Only
the receiver, or someone who has the receiver’s private key,
will be able to decrypt and understand the data. Therefore, the
confidentiality is guaranteed.
B. Services’ Importance for the Current Applications
Entity authentication and message confidentiality are the
most critical services in almost all of the current network appli-
cations. A smart healthcare environment is a typical example
of the importance of these services. The system is required to
secure the transmitted data in order to keep patients’ privacy
from intruders. Further, it is crucial to authenticate the right
doctor, the hospital and the pharmacy and secure their access
to the data.
To generate the private/public keys for the system,
many algorithms have been proposed, including RSA [29],
ElGamal [30], and elliptic curve [31]. Discussing these algo-
rithms is out of the scope of this paper. However, in general,
these are complex and need an infrastructure to generate
and manage the public/private keys. The certificate author-
ities (CA), the Web of trust (WoT) and the entity-based
cryptosystem have been introduced to create, manage, use,
store, and distribute the keys. In the following subsections,
we discuss both the traditional and the blockchain-based key
management approaches, including CA and the Web of trust.
In a later subsection, we discuss the entity-based cryptosystem
which is the current trend that extends the CA mechanisms to
make a better use of the public key cryptography.
C. Key Management by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The public key infrastructure (PKI) is one way to pro-
vide the key management for the public key cryptography.
Traditionally, there are two conventional approaches to achieve
PKI, centralized by a CA and decentralized by WoT. The CA-
based PKI is the most commonly used approach and it has
been standardized in the X.509 standard [32]. In this approach,
the CA is a third-party entity that is trusted by all members
in the system. The CA issues “certificates,” which authen-
ticate users and bind each user to a public key. A signed
certificate, binding a user to its public key, will authenticate
the ownership of that public key to that specific user. The
other traditional approach is WoT, which was proposed in
1992 by Phil Zimmerman. This technique utilizes a decen-
tralized approach in which the keys are generated locally and
will be trusted if they are verified by at least one other trusted
user in the system [33].
D. Problems With the Traditional PKI Systems
Both of the traditional techniques suffer from several chal-
lenges which are discussed in this subsection.
The CA-based PKI comes with three major challenges:
a trusted third party, a single-point-of-failure, and cost. The
users of the systems must trust the CA in generating and man-
aging their public keys which imposes high-security risks if
the CA is compromised. This architecture has a single point of
failure as the whole system fails if the CA fails. Furthermore,
the management of the public keys by one centralized CA can
be both expensive and inefficient, especially with the current
massively distributed applications where a large number of
users are involved [34].
On the other hand, in the WoT-based PKI, the signers need
to build trustworthiness. The users join the network only if
they are trusted by another “trusted” member. In other words,
new members joining the network need to build prior trust
with other members who are already in the system. This can
lead to a barrier for new members entering the network [34].
Moreover, both the CA-based and the WoT-based PKI are
unable to provide identity retention. That is, it is possible
for a user to impersonate the identity or the public key of
an already registered user. Some proposals have been offered
to solve this problem; however, they are mostly log-based,
which could be highly complex, especially in the case of the
worldwide distribution of the users [34].
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TABLE V
THE TRADITIONAL PKI PROBLEMS AND THE
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS
E. Blockchain-Based PKI Concept
The distributed, the event-recording and non-reproducibility
features of the blockchain technology make it a desirable tech-
nique for several applications. Particularly, these properties
prove the blockchains’ suitability for PKI and domain name
services (DNS). Since the blockchain-based PKI solutions are
distributed; they have no centralized point of failure. The trust
is built based on the majority vote of the miners; hence, there is
no single trusted third-party and it does not require prior trust-
worthiness in the system. More importantly, the blockchain
technology has several open-source implementations, which
helps build cost-effective and efficient solutions. The prob-
lems with the traditional approaches and how the blockchains
can solve them is summarized in Table V.
In the following, we discuss several approaches to achieve
blockchain-based PKI.
1) Instant Karma PKI (IKP): The Instant Karma PKI (IKP)
framework extends the traditional CA approach by recording
the CA behavior to the blockchain database. In this way, mis-
behaving or compromised CAs can be detected by the network
and a riposte must happen. The event recording feature of
the blockchains facilitates the CA tracking and monitoring by
the blockchain users and helps detect the misbehaving CAs.
This approach can reduce the trust problem in the traditional
CA-based algorithm as eventually misbehaving CA can be
detected.
IKP is a research work that was proposed in 2017 and ver-
ified in terms of cost saving and distribution. An open source
implementation was also promised but has not come available
at the time of this writing [35]. However, having a CA in the
system still lead to a single point of failure system. Trying to
solve this matter by having several CAs imposes cost; thus,
leading to even a more expensive solution.
2) Pemcor: Pemcor utilizes the blockchain database as
a distributed and secure data store [36]. The idea is to let
the CA issue a certificate which is not signed. Instead, the
hash value of the certificate is stored in the blockchain which
is controlled by authorities, like by banks or governments.
Such authorities share two blockchain databases, one for
Fig. 4. The architecture of Gan’s approach.
the generated certificates and one for the revoked certifi-
cates. When verifying, the authority checks its maintained
blockchain data stores. If the hash of the certificate exists in
the generated certificate blockchain and is not in the revoked
certificates blockchain, the certificate is valid; otherwise, it is
not. This idea is simple and provides several advantages such
as an easy verification with low delay guarantees.
Pemcor is part of a project that aims to find a solution
for identity proofing and replaces the traditional knowledge-
based verification. The project was proposed and documented
theoretically by several white papers in 2016, however, it still
lacks the complete implementation and the evaluation of the
system. Given other approaches presented in this section, this
work is not expected to contribute further to the blockchain-
based PKI systems.
3) Gan’s Approach: Gan [37] propose a key-based authen-
tication system dedicated to the IoT environments. The idea is
to use a private blockchain for storing the nodes’ latest public
keys, validating the keys, and allowing others to request the
nodes’ keys. The architecture of this approach is illustrated in
Fig. 4, where a Centralized CA (CCA) is assumed to be fully
secured. Several validators, donated as Device Manufacturer
Validators (DMVs), are connected to the CCA.
The DMVs are hosted by the IoT manufacturers and they
are required to have the computational capabilities to generate
the public/private keys, to perform mining and to maintain the
blockchain database. The IoT devices are connected to these
validators and are assumed to be simple without any computa-
tional capability. Initially, a DMV joins the blockchain network
by requesting the CCA to authenticate it. The CCA validates
the DMV and constructs a transaction that contains the DMV
public key, the validator address, and the CCA’s signature.
The transaction is submitted to the blockchain and the DMV
is now known to the others. Accordingly, the DMV can add
a new IoT node by submitting a transaction containing the
node’s public key and address to the blockchain. Furthermore,
the DMVs can update or revoke their IoT devices’ public keys
by submitting transactions.
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This work has an open-source implementation that is avail-
able on GitHub and referenced in [37]. The implementation
utilizes Network Simulator version 3 (NS3) to build and eval-
uate their proposed approach. Even though the approach was
initially applied to the IoT platforms, the idea can be imple-
mented in any other networking applications including sensor
networks, health care, or even micro clouds platforms.
It should be noted that these previously discussed three
approaches use the blockchains only as distributed databases
to share and validate the keys. In other words, they do not
benefit from the other important properties of the blockchains
including the distributed consensus and the non-repudiation
guarantees. In addition, as it was mentioned before, having
a CA that generates the keys does not resolve the problems
of centralization; hence, the single point of failure in the
traditional PKI approaches.
4) Distributed PKI (DPKI): Allen et al. [38] sketch the
principles of an appropriate blockchain-based PKI, which is
referred to as Distributed PKI (DPKI). The DPKI uses the
blockchain technology as a distributed, trustless database that
eliminates the need for a CA and gives the users the direct
control and ownership of their data. This work uses a Web
registration domain, where the user spawns its public/private
key and submits the public key to the blockchain network as
a transaction. In this work, it is claimed that the blockchain
technology can resolve the traditional problems and protects
the network against man in the middle attacks. This protection
is granted by linking the most recent key of the user to his/her
identity.
The paper did not include any implementation-related
aspects; nevertheless, it introduced the possibility of
blockchain-based PKI, which was later implemented in many
other works as will be discussed next.
5) Blockstack: Blockstack ID is an appropriate blockchain-
based approach that uses Namecoin to build a distributed
PKI system. Namecoin, [40], is a fork of Bitcoin that allows
data storage within the blockchain transactions. It is imple-
mented by defining a name-value pair that is used to store
usernames and can be recorded in the transactions. Namecoin
was originated to store the DNS names, allowing users to reg-
ister their human-readable name and associating names with
the corresponding public keys.
Blockstack ID modifies Namecoin by adding another name-
value pair dedicated for the public keys. The advantage of
using Namecoin is that it already supports the name-value
pairs in its transactions. Thus, the public key is the value
and the name is the identity of the owner. Blockstack imple-
mentation binds the user identity to an elliptic curve public
key which is one of the strongest public key cryptography
mechanisms to date.
Blockstack was released as an open-source software in 2014
and is currently serving as a PKI system for 55,000 users. It is
probably the most popular blockchain-based PKI among other
techniques discussed in this section. However, some issues
such as how the system would handle the public key updates,
the lookups, and the revocations have not been considered in
Blockstack. Also, the identity retention problem is not been
resolved.
6) Certcoin: Certcoin, [41], is another fully decentralized
PKI that relies on Namecoin to build its platform. Unlike
Blockstack ID, this platform provides the identity retention
guarantee. As in the traditional PKI approaches, this system
is composed of 5 functions: registration, update, lookup, ver-
ification and revocation. During the registration, the owner
originates its own private and public keys locally. It keeps
the private key to itself and submits a transaction of the pub-
lic key and its signature to the blockchain. The blockchain
network verifies the transaction signature and the fact that this
ownership was not registered before in the system. If the veri-
fication is successful, the (ID-public key) tuple is added to the
blockchain; otherwise, it is dropped. To update the public key,
the owner submits a transaction containing the identity along
with the previous public key, the new public key, and the sig-
nature. Miners need to verify that the signature is correct, the
identity exists in the blockchain, and it is associated with the
previous public key. Then the mined blocks are broadcasted to
the network to be verified. The verification follows a similar
process where the owner submits a transaction requesting the
blockchain network to verify the key which can be done by
the miners and other blockchain nodes.
Certcoin has 3 versions, numbered 0, 1, and 2. The first
version (version 0) required complex computations and oper-
ations while the second and the third versions tried to reduce
this complexity by accelerating the blockchain processing.
Version 0 had all the five functions submitted and mined by
the blockchain network as in Bitcoin. However, those func-
tions are complex and result in a computationally expensive
process. Thus, versions 1 and 2 tried to reduce this complexity
by a cryptographic accumulator and a distributed hash table,
respectively. A cryptographic accumulator is a space-efficient
data structure that is used to reduce the time and the complex-
ity of the verification process [42]. A distributed hash table
supports fast look-ups for the public key queries; hence, the
complexity of the lookup and the verification is reduced [43].
Therefore, the verification, the lookup and the update functions
have been simplified in both versions 1 and 2.
Similar to Blockstack, Certcoin is an open-source imple-
mentation that was first released in 2014. The project was one
of the first blockchain-based PKI and is offered by MIT [41].
However, Certcoin is less popular compared to Blockstack due
to the lack of proper documentations and the lack of updates
to the software.
7) Guardtime Solution: Guardtime provides another solu-
tion for secure authentications of the IoT devices using
the blockchains and physically unclonable functions (PUFs).
A PUF is a digital fingerprint hardware that serves as a unique
identifier of the devices. The PUFs use the unique charac-
teristics of each device to generate its unique private/public
keys. Guardtime employs PUFs to generate the public/private
keys. The public keys are submitted to the blockchain in
transactions. IoT devices have limited memory; hence, they
cannot store large private/public keys [44]. In other words, the
solution provided by PUF and Guardtime helps such devices
regenerating the same key each time it is needed.
Guardtime is an enterprise that currently offers blockchain-
based solutions for several industries including the insurance
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companies, the physical supply chains, the cloud providers,
and many others. Guardtime Federal is a fork from Guardtime
that started in 2014 and is dedicated to providing cyber-
security solutions for the U.S. department of Defense, the
U.S. Intelligence Community, and other U.S. Government
departments. All solutions offer the confidentiality and authen-
tication services. However, these solutions are mainly dedi-
cated to supply chains and their integrity assurance, as will be
discussed in Section VI-E.
8) Blockchain-Based Trust and Authentication for
Decentralized Sensor Networks: Moinet et al. [45], propose
an approach of using the blockchain technology as a database
to store the public keys, the digital signatures and some peers’
information in a wireless sensor network. This approach
is similar to Certcoin, since it allows the nodes to verify
and authenticate each other using the blockchain network.
Initially, when a node wants to join the network, it submits
a credential transaction, or a credential payload as referred
in the paper. This transaction has the master public key and
a signed hash value that is used to authenticate the node.
A node can submit a transaction to renew or revoke its own
public key. In addition, this approach introduces a “blame
transaction” which defines the trust level of all nodes in the
network. A node is blamed whenever its trustworthiness goes
below a certain defined level. The blame transaction includes
the node that generated the blame, the blamed node and the
block that had the node ID and the public key included.
Furthermore, all the blocks must have a miner’s approval
transaction to be valid. A miner’s approval transaction would
include the miner ID, a nonce, the new node’s public key,
and the signature of the miner.
It should be noted that this approach is an extension of the
Web of trust traditional approach, where a node can join the
network only if another node (miner) approves it. Also, this
is mainly a research work that does not include any proper
blockchain implementation, thus, is not getting practical and
popular compared to Blockstack or Certcoin.
F. Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC)
Recently, identity-based cryptography (IBC) has gained
interest in the network security community. IBC is a public
key mechanism that uses the node’s ID as the public key rather
than generating the traditional lengthy public keys. A node’s
ID can be the node’s name or any arbitrary string that can be
used as the public key. The encryption approach, as depicted
in Fig. 5, consists of four phases: setup, extract, encrypt, and
decrypt.
In the setup phase, a private key generator (PKG) generates
a master secret key along with some public system parameters.
The secret key is kept private while the system parameters are
made public. To extract the keys, the generator uses the system
parameter in addition to its master secret key and the user’s
ID. These parameters are used to construct a secret key which
is sent back to the user. For other nodes to encrypt a mes-
sage, they use the ID and the public parameters to generate
a ciphertext. The user uses its own private key to decrypt the
message. A similar approach is used for the signature and the
Fig. 5. Identify-based encryption phases.
verification, where the signature is generated with the node’s
secret key while the verification is done with the node’s ID
and the public system parameters [46].
A generalization of the IBC is to build a Hierarchal
IBC (HIBC) where the public key has a hierarchal identity
basis that can be represented by a tree. For example, the pub-
lic key of Alice at organization X is Alice@X rather than
Alice. The encryption phases of HIBC are the same as the
four phases in the IBC with an additional phase, called del-
egation. This phase allows an entity to generate secret keys
for its children. In other words, the system needs one PKG to
generate the secret key for the root. Others secret key can be
driven from that key [47].
G. Problems With the Current IBC-Based Approaches
The problem with both the IBC and the HIBC approaches
is that they require the PKG to generate the private keys.
Therefore, the system is centralized which makes it a single
point of failure and imposes a third-party trust requirement. It
is centralized as the PKG is the only authority that can gener-
ate key pairs. If the PKG is compromised, the whole system
is compromised. In other words, the IBC and the HIBC have
the same limitation as the CA-based PKI traditional approach.
Moreover, the PKG generates the users’ private keys; hence,
all the users should trust the PKG not to misuse their private
keys.
H. Blockchain-Based IBC
Similar to the blockchain-based PKI approaches, the
blockchain technology can be used as a distributed database
to resolve the problems of the traditional IBC approaches.
Since, the blockchain technology has a decentralized database,
it solves the problems of centralization and the single point of
failure. It does not require a third-party trust as the users can
generate their own master keys. However, if a user has limited
resources and cannot generate its own key, it can delegate that
to any other node that it trusts.
The basis of the blockchain-based IBC systems is to let the
users generate their own keys. This indicates that the setup
and the extract phases are done at the user level. Then, the
public parameters are submitted to the blockchain as a transac-
tion. The blockchain nodes check whether these parameters are
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valid and they have not been used before. Any user can later
query the blockchain network for other users’ public param-
eters which are used to authenticate the user and encrypt the
confidential messages.
1) Blockchain-Based IBE for Information-Centric
Networking (ICN): The blockchain-based IBC can be
applied to secure the Information-Centric Networking (ICN)
which considers “content names” as the main element for
security, i.e., as the basis for inter-network communication.
Therefore, it is practical to utilize the HIBC approach to secure
the ICN, as the contents are designed to be hierarchical [47].
Fotiou and Polyzos [48] utilize the blockchain-based IBC
to provide distributed security for the ICN networks, where
a content owner wishes to share some data with the sub-
scribers. This approach consists of two phases: setup and
retrieval. In the setup phase, the owner generates the public
parameters and a secret key that are required by the HIBC. In
other words, the owner acts as a PKG for itself. It registers the
public parameters to the blockchain network by submitting
a new transaction. Then, when a subscriber wants to access
the data, it queries the network for the public parameters
of the corresponding content. This means that instead of
consulting the centralized PKG in the traditional HIBC
algorithm, the subscriber consults the distributed blockchain.
These activities are recorded in the transactions; hence,
cannot be denied once the transactions are committed to the
blockchain database. Thus, the blockchain technology can
provide both the integrity and the provenance services, in
addition to solving the centralized architecture challenges.
This scheme can be applied to any ICN or other simi-
lar applications. However, the initial implementations of this
scheme showed a high level of complexity in generating the
public keys. This problem resulted in restricting the scheme’s
practicality and popularity among the resource-limited ICN
applications that are emerging.
I. Summary
The public key cryptography is an important security frame-
work that is used widely to provide the authentication and the
confidentiality services. Such services are critical for most of
the current applications including IoT and healthcare. A man-
agement system is required to provide a proper infrastructure
for such services. PKI is a framework to generate, distribute
and manage public keys for the entities in the system. In
this section, we discussed the traditional PKI systems and
how the blockchains can be used to resolve their problems.
We further presented several proposed approaches providing
blockchain-based PKI solutions. Furthermore, we discussed
the IBC technique which is a recent popular technique in pro-
viding security services. We presented the traditional IBC,
their problems, the blockchain-based IBC, and a proposed
approach for a blockchain-based IBC. Table VI shows the
comparisons among the discussed approaches from different
perspectives. It should be noted that even though these systems
exist and are open-source, only few are utilized in real-world
applications.
IV. PRIVACY SERVICES
A privacy service offers the user the rights to control and
set rules for its data and resources accessed by the network.
In other words, it enables the data or resource owners to con-
trol the disclosure of their information. This is generally done
by letting the user define his access control list (ACL). In
this section, we investigate the requirements of providing the
data privacy, its importance for the current applications, the
traditional techniques for privacy, and the challenges currently
faced in providing the privacy service efficiently. Then, we
give an overview on how the blockchains can be used to pro-
vide privacy and summarize a few existing blockchain-based
privacy providing systems.
A. Data Privacy and ACL
The data privacy requires that all personal and sensitive
information remain confidential (not public) and access to
them can be controlled by the data owners. The ACL assures
that by defining a set of rules stating who can access a spe-
cific set of data and when. To illustrate the privacy problem,
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consider the users in organizations such as Facebook, Google,
banks and government surveillance. Each user must provide
his/her personal information. Thus, these organizations have
a massive amount of personal data that should not be made
public. Individuals have little or no control over the storage and
the access to their information. Therefore, the data privacy can
be violated. Many controversial incidents have been reported,
especially with banks and government surveillance [49], [50].
The privacy concerns exist whenever the data is collected,
stored, used, destroyed, or even deleted. In other words, pri-
vacy applies to the data in motion and at rest. Several federal
laws have been developed to prevent information leakage; as
an instance, the healthcare information privacy laws [51]. For
all these reasons, privacy is a major concern for application
and network developers.
B. Importance of Privacy in Current Applications
The data privacy is a prominent interest in the era of
cloud computing and networking systems where many users
share the same physical storage or network. Application devel-
opers migrate their storage and computations to the clouds
and require the data privacy to be granted. Moreover, IoT,
healthcare, smart grids, and several other popular networking
applications need to process and store a massively large
amount of data, generally using cloud computing. Privacy is
a critical requirement for most of these applications that are
involved with personal information or location knowledge. The
problem of privacy is intesified in case of using multiple clouds
and internetworking among them.
C. Traditional Techniques for Data Privacy
Generally, the data privacy can be provided by delegating
the ACL definitions to the data owners and using encryption
techniques to prevent others from accessing the data. Hence,
the organizations who amass or process the data have no rights
to access the if the ACL does not permit. Design and imple-
mentation techniques to provide the privacy service is among
the most active research topics, and several techniques have
been proposed so far. For example, homomorphic encryption,
which allows the computation and the processing the encrypted
data and returns encrypted results, is one way to provide the
data privacy service [52].
Another privacy aspect, which is out of the scope of this
paper, is hiding the user’s identity. Data anonymization and
differential privacy mechanisms hide the identity of the user
and make it difficult to link the data to its owner. For
example, K-anonymity, a common way to anonymize the
datasets, requires the sensitive information to be similar to
at least K-1 other records [53]. L-diversity, an extension of
the K-anonymity approach, guarantees that the sensitive infor-
mation is stored in “diverse enough” possible locations [54].
T-closeness is another approach that looks at the distribution
of sensitive data [55]. Differential privacy uses data pertur-
bation techniques or adds noise to them before sharing the
data [56]. Most blockchain implementations provide pseudo-
anonymous user privacy. For example, Bitcoin utilizes the
hashes to identify the users, rather than their real names. The
users stay hidden from others and remain anonymous to the
system unless sophisticated attack actions are taken [1].
D. Problems With the Traditional Techniques
Despite the fact that several research efforts exist, provide an
efficient data privacy service is still challenging. Some of the
challenges include efficiency, scalability, data ownership and
lack of systematic data lifecycle approach. In the following,
we briefly summarize these problems and refer the readers
to [57] for more detailed discussion.
• Efficiency and Scalability: Most of the data privacy tech-
niques rely on complex cryptographic algorithms; hence,
they are inefficient and difficult to scale with large
applications. Recent research tries to reduce the com-
plexity and enhance the efficiency of these cryptographic
techniques [58]. However, the proposed approaches still
lack practicality in most cases. Further, most algorithms
fail to scale with the massive amount of data processing
required in the current networks.
• Data Ownership and Control: The questions of who owns
the data and who can modify it are critical in privacy.
The owner generally is the party that decides the access
control rules for the data. Unfortunately, the traditional
techniques discussed in the previous subsection still lack
an answer to the ownership question.
• Systematic Data Lifecycle Approach: A framework for
the data privacy needs to be constructed to systematically
define the lifecycle of the data. This framework should
identify the phases, define their privacy requirements, and
allow flexibility in the lifecycle changes. These phases
can include the acquisition, the sharing and the deletion
of the data and the resources involved in the system .
However, a systematic approach is still missing in most
of the proposed privacy techniques.
E. Blockchain-Based Data Privacy Techniques
The blockchain technology can be used to provide decen-
tralized end-to-end data privacy guarantees that can resolve
some of the problems discussed in the previous subsection.
Specifically, it can provide the data ownership solutions and
dynamically change the access rights when needed. However,
since the blockchains depend on cryptographic techniques,
the blockchain-based techniques are still complex. The prob-
lems associated with the traditional approaches and how
the blockchain technology can solve them are presented in
Table VII.
The idea behind the ideal blockchain-based data privacy is
to build a blockchain layer over the data storage layer, let the
owner define the desired ACL through smart contracts, and
publish the ACL and the data to as the blockchain transactions
(encrypted using sophisticated encryption techniques). In this
way, organizations such as Facebook or Google will not own
the data as happens in the traditional techniques. However,
they will be a part of the blockchain network and they will be
able to process the data only when the ACL allows them. This
type of blockchains is called the permissioned blockchains.
Policies to define the data access are either based on the smart
SALMAN et al.: SECURITY SERVICES USING BLOCKCHAINS: STATE OF ART SURVEY 869
TABLE VII
TRADITIONAL DATA PRIVACY PROBLEMS AND
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS
contracts or on the data management messages. Further, an
off-chain database can be used to store the encrypted data as
the blockchain memory is limited and cannot store massive
amounts of data. In the following, we discuss several recent
approaches that utilize the blockchain technology to provide
the privacy service.
1) Zyskind’s Approach: Zyskind et al. [21], propose
a decentralized data privacy approach that ensures the users’
control over their data and uses the blockchain blocks to store
the data and the ACL. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the system
is composed of three main components: users, providers and
the blockchain network. The users are nodes interested in
downloading an application or using a service. Providers,
who hold such services or applications, need to process the
users’ personal data for operational and business purposes.
The blockchain nodes are the untrusted entities that constitute
the blockchain network and have a distributed data store (off-
chain data store). The data is distributed and replicated among
the data stores to ensure the privacy and the high availability
services.
The blockchain network accepts two types of transactions:
Taccess and Tdata. The Taccess is used for the control and
the management operations on the data, such as defining the
ACL and modifying the access rights. The Tdata is used for
Fig. 6. Zyskind’s proposed system components.
data storage and retrieval. The owner can change the permis-
sion and the access controls by sending a policy set in the
Taccess transaction, which is checked for correctness by the
blockchain nodes. Similarly, a user or a service provider can
access the data by sending a Tdata transaction which will
be approved by the blockchain nodes if the policies specified
earlier are met. The returned response (access information or
denial) is encrypted; hence, unauthorized users cannot have
access the data.
Zyskind’s Approach is a research work that has been veri-
fied theoretically and practically in their paper [21]. However,
the open-source implementation of the proposed approach is
still missing thus, practicality and suitability of the proposed
approach are still to be testified.
2) Blockchain-Based Data Sharing (BBDS): Blockchain-
based data sharing (BBDS) is another approach proposed
to provide privacy for the medical records in a cloud
environment [59]. It uses a simplified blockchain architecture
that is scalable and efficient for lightweight communication
systems. The system is composed of three layers: the user
layer, the management layer, and the storage layer. In the
following, we briefly explain the rules for each layer:
• The user layer: The user layer includes the individuals or
the organizations who want to access or store their data
and services.
• The management layer: The management layer includes
issuers, verifiers, and consensus nodes. The issuers
authenticate the users when they first come and han-
dle their registrations. The verifiers authenticate the users
later and manage their keys. The consensus nodes con-
struct the blockchain network and process the new blocks
the same way as in Bitcoin processing.
• The storage layer: The storage layer includes cloud-based
data storage and processing infrastructures to securely
store and process the data.
The block structure in the BBDS is simplified by modifying
the transaction and block header fields to meet the health-
care records requirements. Furthermore, the interactions in
the system are secured by identity-based authentication and
encryption techniques which are simple, efficient, provably
secure, and lightweight.
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Fig. 7. FairAccess resource request process.
BBDS is implemented in a private permissioned blockchain
that does not rely on any of the open-source blockchains
discussed earlier in Section II-D. The theoretical and the ini-
tial implementation of the proposed approach showed a good
performance compared to Bitcoin complexity. However, the
full system is under development and thus it is not yet popular
at the time of this writing.
3) FairAccess: FairAccess utilizes the smart contracts to
define the access control policies and make authorization
decisions [60]. The system uses the blockchain transactions
to define authorization tokens. These tokens are used by
the sender to authorize the receiver in accessing parts of
the sender’s data. Functions in FairAccess include: resource
registration, grant access, request access and revoke access.
This approach is not implemented in the paper; however,
the theoretical analyses showed that the data privacy could be
preserved by the provided integrity, authentication, encryption
and consensus access control monitoring.
4) Dynamic Access Control for IoT Using FairAccess:
FairAccess has been utilized to provide a distributed, secured,
and adaptive ACL management for the IoT environments [61].
The proposed idea is to let the users register their new
resources and define their access policies through the smart
contracts associated with these resources. The process of
requesting a resource, as depicted in Fig. 7, involves sev-
eral steps. First, when a request is made for a resource that
is held by user A, it is directed to the blockchain network.
In turn, the blockchain network allows/denies the access
request based on the associated resource’s smart contract.
The network sends a feedback to the requester granting or
denying his access request. Further, the owner can update
his/her access policy based on the received feedback from
the blockchain network using deep reinforcement learning, an
adaptive machine learning mechanism.
This approach is implemented and testified for a specific
IoT use-case. The implementation is done on top of Bitcoin
and the results show the feasibility of the proposed approach in
providing the right access control list management. However,
the lack of real-time support, the block complexity and the
inflexible implementation are still drawbacks that burden the
practicality and the widespread of the proposed approach.
5) Decentralized Runtime Access Monitoring
System (DRAMS): Ferdous et al. [62] utilize the blockchain
technology to verify access control logs for clouds in
a federated cloud environment. The key idea is to use the
smart contracts in defining the access rights and collecting
the access logs from different clouds. The blockchain miners
compare the access rights to the access logs. If a violation
is detected, an alert is raised to be further handled by the
system.
This approach was implemented on top of the Ethereum
platform. Results show that the system is resilient to many
threats, including compromising the communication channel to
modify the access rights, compromising the policy evaluation
to allow unauthorized accesses, and compromising the logs to
alter or delete them. However, latency, cost and scalability are
the challenges that need to be considered for this platform to
become practical.
6) Data Privacy for IoT Data Storage and Sharing: IoT is
witnessing a rapid increase in the number of innovative appli-
cations; however, security is still a major concern. Most current
ACL mechanisms are delegated to a trusted, centralized con-
troller that maintains and manages the access controls. On the
other hand, the blockchain-based data privacy can help resolve
the problems with centralization and provide decentralized,
resilient, and auditable privacy guarantees. Shafagh et al. [63]
use the blockchain network to securely store and manage
the access permissions. The blockchain transactions are com-
posed of the ownership of the data and the corresponding
access permissions. Initially, the owner submits a transaction
that includes the data stream identifier. A new transaction is
issued when the owner wants to share the data with other
users or with the service providers. Further, the owner can
revoke his data sharing by submitting a revoke transaction.
When a provider or another user wants to retrieve a specific set
of data, they send a request to the storage node which queries
the blockchain network for the access rights. Data, in both the
blockchain database and the storage nodes, is encrypted and
highly distributed. This mitigates the threats of malicious stor-
age nodes that grant service access rights without consulting
the blockchain.
An initial implementation of this scheme was built on top
of the Bitcoin platform. Results showed a reasonable overhead
due to the routing loads, the point-to-point communication and
the distributed storage. However, the latency and the scalabil-
ity challenges are not resolved, especially for real-time IoT
applications.
F. Summary and Comparisons
The data privacy is a critical security aspect that guar-
antees the user’s control over their data disclosures and
prevents unauthorized access and processing. In this section,
we discussed several blockchain-based approaches providing
the data privacy. Such approaches define the ACL either by
the smart contracts or by special management transactions.
Monitoring of the access rules and the violations can be
done by the blockchain nodes to fully eliminate centralization.
Table VIII compares the different discussed approaches. It
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should be noted that these approaches handle the data privacy
rather than the user privacy. Most blockchain implementations
provide a pseudo-anomalous user privacy using the hashes to
identify the users rather than their actual names.
V. PROVENANCE SERVICES
Data or resource provenance is another security service that
deals with the tractability and the auditability of the resources.
In this section, we discuss the traditional techniques provide
the data provenance and highlight their problems. Following
that, we discuss how the blockchains can help in providing
a provenance architecture, highlight some of the proposed
approaches that utilize the blockchain technology to provide
the data provenance services and give a brief comparison
among the different discussed blockchain-based provenance
approaches.
A. Data and Resource Provenance
Data provenance refers to the metadata that tracks and
reports the originality of the data and the operations associated
with them. The metadata includes records of the inputs, the
entities, the systems, and the processes that accessed or manip-
ulated the data of interest. An example would be the tracking
of the data ownership and the accessing of some information
in a cloud environment. When dealing with clouds, the data are
massively scaled, and the resources are shared by many differ-
ent entities. It is important to track the origin of the data and
the operations happened on them, including the reading, the
processing and the writing of the data or the resources. This is
not only applied to the data, but also to any type of resources
such as the network devices, the workflows, the Web services,
and the processes.
Providing provenance guarantees resource tractability,
forensic capabilities, and auditability. In other words, it helps
the network administrators in detecting any access violation
or any malicious operation. However, this service comes with
two issues, complexity and privacy violation. Keeping track of
the resources is challenging and complex, especially for the
distributed applications. Data or resources can be replicated in
different areas to provide availability and they might follow
different paths to provide resilience guarantees. Furthermore,
the amount of data is massively increasing, which makes
tracking complex and inefficient. Further, such tracking may
violate privacy if the information about the data ownership
and the data originality is exposed. Due to this reason, guar-
anteeing the data provenance without violating the privacy is
a challenge to be resolved in the current applications.
B. Importance of Provenance
In the age of social networking, cloud computing, IoT, and
other distributed applications, data is an acute resource that is
open and vulnerable to intrusions. The owners need to know
not only the data originality, but also the manipulations and the
accesses to the data along its lifecycle. For example, in IoT
applications, the sensor data has to be tracked so that they
get to the consumers without any unauthorized modification.
Further, the consumers need to know how accurate the infor-
mation is and what time it was sent. This can be achieved only
by proper data provenance techniques. The same provenance
requirements are applied to the healthcare data, the financial
data, the governmental resource, or even scientific applica-
tions. Such applications are worldwide, generating massive
amounts of data that need to be tracked. Hence, the provenance
guarantees are crucial for these applications.
C. The Traditional Techniques
State-of-the-art techniques in providing the data provenance
in the cloud environments are based on logging and auditing
techniques. Most of these approaches are used at the central-
ized authority that manages the system resources. Examples
of the data provenance approaches include PASS [64],
S2Logger [65], and SPROVE [66]. PASS was one of the first
approaches to provide the data provenance service by collect-
ing and maintaining information about the operations done
at the system level [64]. S2Logger is a tracking tool that
provides an end-to-end resource monitoring in a cloud envi-
ronment at the file level [65]. SPROVE is a technique that
provides confidentiality and integrity of the data provenance
through encryption and signature techniques [66]. In addition,
Asghar et al. [67] propose a secure data provenance technique
that utilizes encryption techniques to enhance the privacy of
the data provenance.
D. Problems With the Traditional Techniques
The techniques discussed in the previous subsection have
several challenges, including ineffectiveness, complexity, lack
of privacy and centralized controllers. The cloud hardware and
software are distributed by nature and have several layers of
interoperability, which makes the logging techniques ineffi-
cient. Tracking resources can be complex in nature as the
cloud resources may move to provide load balancing and to
ensure resilience. Further, employing security techniques like
encryption and digital signature can add an additional level of
complexity to the system. However, not having encryption and
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signature may break the data privacy if the data’s origin and the
data ownership are exposed to a third party. Finally, to store
the logging information or to monitor the data in a system,
a centralized controller is needed, which requires a trusted
third party that is complex, expensive and a single point of
failure.
E. Blockchain-Based Data Provenance
The blockchain technology can be viewed as a shared
immutable ledger that record the events in the system. Thus, it
is a potential approach to provide the data provenance service
by recording the evidence of the data originality and the oper-
ations in the blockchain transactions. However, the integrity
and the confidentiality of the blocks should be granted by any
blockchain-based data provenance. The problems with the tra-
ditional approaches and how the blockchains can resolve them
are presented in Table IX.
In the following, we discuss several approaches that uti-
lize the blockchains to provide the data provenance service.
Further, we discuss some other supply chain provenance
approaches and how they can be applied to provide the
data provenance service.
1) ProvChain: ProvChain is a blockchain-based data prove-
nance system that offloads encrypted provenance records to the
blockchain database in the form of transactions [68]. It utilizes
the blockchain database as a distributed database that provides
the integrity and non-reputability guarantees. The validation
of the data provenance is done off-chain by a centralized
provenance auditor (PA). The system consists of five com-
ponents: users, cloud service providers, blockchain network,
provenance database, and the PA. The users are the resource
owners or the data accessors. The providers offer storage
services and are responsible for the users’ registration. The
blockchain network consists of nodes that participate in the
system and keep the data provenance records in the blocks.
Fig. 8. ProvChain system interactions.
The provenance database records all the provenance data on
the blockchain network and locally at the cloud level. Finally,
the auditor retrieves the provenance data from the blockchain
database and validates the blockchain receipt. The interactions
among the various system components are depicted in Fig. 8.
ProvChain has been implemented and evaluated in [68]. The
results demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed approach
and the ability to supply all the security features provides
by the blockchains. ProvChain utilizes a blockchain database
to store the data provenance records. However, the verifica-
tion of the operations and the records is done locally outside
the blockchain network, at a centralized PA. In other words,
ProvChain does not utilize the consensus property of the
blockchain technology.
2) DataProv: DataProv is another platform that uses
the blockchain technology and the smart contracts to
provide data provenance services for the sensitive cloud
information [69]. It is built on top of the Ethereum plat-
form and uses an off-chain JavaScript module to interact
with the users. There are two types of smart contracts:
Document_Track and Vote. A Document_Track contract is an
Ethereum smart contract and is initiated for each document
in the system. The documents can be shared data or any type
of assets shared by the system. The Document_Track con-
tract includes functions such as add a document, grant a user
access, revoke an access, and track the changes in the docu-
ment. The Vote contract records the miners’ votes and includes
functions such as initiate a vote, record a vote and terminate
a process. An overview of the system architecture is illus-
trated in Fig. 9. Initially, the user submits any changes in the
data to the blockchain network and submits a vote contract.
The blockchain network asks the miners, or the voters, of the
system to verify the changes and to report back. The voting
is done based on the majority votes from the miners involved
and the votes are recorded for each change. At the end of the
voting phase, the changes to the document are either accepted
or rejected. If the changes are accepted by the voters, then
the Document_Track contract is updated, and the changes are
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Fig. 9. DataProv architecture.
submitted to the cloud provider. Otherwise, the changes are
rejected after some time and the cloud provider will be notified
to take further actions.
DataProv has been implemented on top of the Ethereum
blockchain platform. Drug trials and wheat production are the
specific use-cases used to evaluate the system. The evaluation
is done on real-life scenarios and shows the feasibility of the
proposed approach in providing provenance guarantees with
low cost and moderate overhead.
3) A Blockchain-Based Approach for Data Accountability
and Provenance Tracking: Neisse et al. [70] propose
a blockchain-based approach for the data accountability and
the provenance tracking. Similar to DataProv, this approach
uses the smart contracts in the public blockchains to define
the access rules for the data. This system is composed of
three main actors: data subjects, data controllers, and data pro-
cessors. Data subjects are the owners of the data and they
authorize the data controllers to access the data. Meanwhile,
data processors are the organizations that are authorized to
process the data on behalf of the controllers. This approach
defines three types of smart contracts that can be summarized
as follows:
• The data subject contract for specific controllers: The
owner of the data creates a contract for each specific
controller that has all or portions of the data. This contract
tracks the data shared with the controller, the access rights
and the operations performed by the controller on the
data. Hence, this contract provides the provenance service
of the data shared with that specific controller.
• The data subject contract for specific data: The owner
defines the rules and the access rights of a set of data that
is accessed by any controller in a smart contract. This
contract tracks a specific data shared with any controller
and the logs associated with operations performed on that
data. In other words, it provides provenance for a specific
data or a set of data that can be shared with any controller.
• The data controller contract for data subjects: The con-
troller creates a contract for any owner that wants to
share the same data with it. This contract defines how
the data received from the data subjects are treated by the
controller. It is used by the subjects, or the owners of the
data, to help decide data sharing rules with that controller.
Further, the contract logs the creation and ownership of
the data, which is also a part of the data provenance
guarantees.
These contracts provide both privacy and provenance for
the data shared with the clouds, the grids or even the services
shared with others. Thus, the approach can be used for any
security service; For example, sharing the patient’s personal
information in a smart healthcare system.
Initial implementation showed the feasibility and practi-
cality of the proposed approach in providing provenance
and privacy. However, the implementation also showed scal-
ability and performance limitations due to the blockchain’s
complexity.
4) Provenance (An Enterprise Project): Provenance is an
enterprise project that offers a blockchain-based tracking
of physical items or resources in a supply chain [71]. It
associates every physical product with a digital identity to
provide the traceability and the transparency for that prod-
uct. The idea is to have the producers register their products
to the blockchain system with certifications or tags. Then, the
blockchain network tracks the changes made to that product.
An event is recorded to the blockchain each time a change is
made, or a product reaches a certain stage in its lifecycle. In
this way, the products can be traced when shipped from the
producers to the consumers.
Use-cases showed the feasibility of the Provenance’s
approach to track commercial products such as foods or goods.
Even though Provenance’s technique strictly applies to the
physical products, it can be extended to audit and risk manage-
ment of the data in enterprises. For example, it is possible to
track the data in the cloud when they move from the data cen-
ter to the user or vice versa. In this case, Provenance can
provide a solution by letting the user register the data in
the blockchain, where the tracking, the recording and the
validation of the data can happen.
5) IBM Supply Chain: Similar to Provenance, IBM pro-
vides their own blockchain-based supply chain tracking using
the Hyperledger blockchain platform. The concept is similar to
other blockchain-based data provenance, whereas any change
or any operation done on the data is logged to the blockchain
database in transactions. IBM use-cases are also dedicated to
tracking physical products; however, they can be extended to
digital applications easily [72].
6) Other Blockchain-Based Supply Chain: Even though
IBM and Provenance are the most popular blockchain-based
supply chains, there exist some other approaches that do
the same. These approaches mostly care about the physi-
cal products and other goods provenance, but their approach
can be applied to the data and the digital resources, as
in Provenance. BlockVerify is a startup that tracks coun-
terfeit products to detect frauds. Their main use-cases
include the pharmaceutical industry, luxury products, dia-
monds, and electronics [73]. Ambrosus is a startup com-
pany that provides supply chain provenance, mainly for the
food products and medicines [74]. Moreover, EverLedger
is another startup company that provides provenance
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TABLE X
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DATA PROVENANCE APPROACHES COMPARISON
guarantees for digital and physical products using a similar
concept [73].
F. Summary and Comparisons
With the amount of data that are being processed in the
current applications, it is critical to know and understand
the data originality, validity, and timing. Data provenance
is one way to provide that by tracking the data owner-
ships and recording the changes. Provenance is critical for
current applications’ auditing and the detection of security
violations. The traditional techniques are mostly inefficient,
complex, centralized, and have no specific protection for
sensitive information. In this section, we discussed blockchain-
based data provenance and described several approaches to
achieve the data provenance with the blockchains. Further, the
blockchain-based supply chain provenance can be modified to
provide data provenance in multi-cloud environments. Table X
compares these approaches.
The complexity of the communication in DataProv and the
centralized PA in ProvChain show that the blockchain-based
data provenance needs more research effort and can be further
enhanced by proper utilization of the smart contracts.
VI. INTEGRITY ASSURANCE SERVICE
Integrity assures that the data has not been modified or
altered when at rest or in motion. In this section, we discuss
the integrity service, its importance for the current applica-
tions, its traditional techniques, and the challenges associated
with them. Then we highlight how the blockchain technology
can help in the integrity verification and discuss some of the
proposed blockchain-based integrity assurance platforms.
A. Integrity Assurance
Integrity assurance deals with the correctness and the valid-
ity of the data stored, accessed, or generated by the network. It
assures that the information has not been changed or corrupted
by unauthorized users. This should be applied to the informa-
tion in motion or at rest. In other words, when the data is
stored in the cloud, generated by a sensor, or is transmitted to
a client, it should not be altered by an unauthorized user.
Providing an end-to-end integrity assurance maintains con-
sistency, reliability, accuracy, and trustworthiness of the infor-
mation over its entire lifecycle. The integrity is one of the basic
components of the CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity) triad for information security [75]. Further, it is a required
service by any interconnection system, as was discussed in
Section I-B [16]. Therefore, guaranteeing the integrity ser-
vice has been investigated for several decades. In most cases,
integrity is ensured by proper signatures and public key cryp-
tographic techniques [29]. However, how to define and trust
a third-party authority to verify the integrity is a challenge,
especially in the current distributed networks.
B. Integrity’s Importance for the Current Applications
Current applications deal with massive amounts of
remote communications that involve many actors, multiple
intermediate devices, and several domains. This makes the
data, the users, and the information inextricably linked to the
cyberspace and vulnerable to many attacks. Attacks include
data thefts and alterations, which might threaten human lives.
For example, in the smart healthcare system, altering the
patients’ information can result in serious consequences, if
the sensor data is altered by intruders. The same threat can
target the IoT platforms, the smart home environments, or the
intelligent transportation systems. Thus, it is critical to provide
integrity for the information shared by the network. Further,
it is important to know the source of the alteration and react
to the changes as quickly as possible.
C. Traditional Integrity Assurance Techniques
Data integrity is commonly assured using cryptographic
tools and data replications. Cryptographic tools such as the
public key cryptography or the keyless signature infrastruc-
ture (KSI) are used to sign the data or the resources so that
an unauthorized person cannot change them. Any change in
the data will be detected by the signature validation tech-
niques. The process is similar to entity authentication which
was explained in Section III-A. Attacks on such techniques
require the attacker to know the secret key in order to sign the
data. Finding the secret key is challenging, but once realized,
the attack becomes practically unpredictable. Replications can
also protect against the data integrity violations. In this tech-
nique, the attacker needs to modify all the replicas, which
can be distributed over several nodes in a randomized fash-
ion. Thus, combining both the replication techniques and the
cryptographic tools can provide the system with a strong
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a data integrity assurance. These are commonly used nowadays
in the cloud environments [76].
D. Problems With the Traditional Techniques
One of the most critical problems with the previously dis-
cussed techniques is not in verifying the integrity but is in
tracking the intruder who tampered the data. It is not feasible
in practice to find the intruder as the tampering could be done
at the storage phase, at the processing phase, or at the com-
munication phase. However, knowing the intruders can help
in detecting malicious behaviors, changing the access control
mechanisms and, in some cases, penalizing these intruders.
In addition, the validation of the data is currently done by
a trusted party, which imposes a security risk of trust and a sin-
gle point of failure. Further, integrity is normally an additional
security service which adds work, resources, and complexity
to the system.
E. Blockchain-Based Integrity Assurance
Blockchain-based architectures are potential approaches to
solve the problems discussed in the previous subsection.
The problems with the traditional approaches and how the
blockchains can resolve them are illustrated in Table XI.
The blockchains have embedded integrity checks as transac-
tions are signed by the sender and verified by the miners. The
data cannot be tampered if it is committed to the blockchain
database as discussed before. Thus, the use of the blockchain
transactions to submit the data or any asset guarantees the
integrity service. Moreover, the blockchain technology can be
used to provide evidence for when the data has changed as
discussed previously in Section V on the data provenance. In
the following, we discuss several integrity techniques using
the blockchain technology.
1) Blockchain-Based Data Integrity Service Framework
for IoT Data: Liu et al. [77] propose a blockchain-based
data integrity framework that uses the smart contracts to
achieve its objectives. This framework is dedicated to IoT
applications that require a producer-consumer architecture. In
this architecture, the owner shares the data with other con-
sumers for specific purposes. The data is generally shared
through the use of the cloud storage services, where the
owner posts the data to the cloud and the consumers access
the data from there. As discussed in the previous subsec-
tion, storing the data in the blockchain database provides the
integrity service. However, the blockchain database are limited
in memory and cannot handle the massive amounts of data.
Thus, storing all the cloud data becomes impractical.
The idea of this framework is to store encrypted hash values
of the data on the blockchain database and these hash values
are then used to check the integrity. The owner generates the
hash value of the data, encrypts the hash value and sends it to
the blockchain network as a smart contract or a transaction.
Further, the owner posts the data to the cloud and allows other
users to access it. The procedure of the integrity assurance is
as follows. First, the owner or the consumer requests the cloud
storage to provide the data stored in the cloud. The consumer
calculates the hash value of the retrieved data. Alternatively,
the owner could ask for the hash value directly from the cloud
if the cloud is capable of doing hash calculations. Then, the
owner or the consumer consults the network for the hash value
of the same data. If the hash values from the cloud and the
blockchain response match, the data is valid, otherwise, it is
not valid.
This approach has been implemented on a private
blockchain. The initial results showed that this technique can
support the integrity verification efficiently in a small-scale
network. However, as it can be seen, the proposed framework
uses the blockchain technology as a distributed database and
it does not make use of the most appealing blockchain char-
acteristics. Furthermore, the consumer could be an IoT device
which generally lacks the required computational power and
might be unable to perform all the required computations.
A better approach would delegate the construction and the val-
idation of the hash values to the blockchain network, which
is consulted for the validity of the data.
2) Storj: Storj is a blockchain-based peer to peer data stor-
age system that utilizes the blockchain database to store hash
values of the data and verify the integrity. The blockchain tech-
nology is immutable and provides integrity checks by design.
Thus, any storage system that utilizes the blockchain transac-
tions to store the data can provide the integrity service. The
data can be stored in the blockchain transactions or off-chain
by storing some metadata in the transactions and the data itself
in the off-chain storages. In Storj, the data is stored off-chain
while the metadata referring to the original data is stored in the
transactions. The metadata has the location of the data and the
hash of the data. Whenever the user wants to access the data,
it inquires the blockchain network. The network validates the
data stored off-chain and returns back the metadata needed to
retrieve the original data. In this way, the integrity is provided
efficiently; however, the requirement of tracking the intruders
in case the data is changed is still not provided [10].
Storj is an open-source implementation that allows secured
and integrity-guaranteed data storage in distributed applica-
tions. It has been verified and tested by many real-case
scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, Storj is the first
876 IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. 21, NO. 1, FIRST QUARTER 2019
blockchain-based cloud storage that is currently used by some
enterprises.
3) Ericsson Blockchain-Based Integrity Assurance:
Ericsson partnered with Guardtime to provide integrity
services that allow the application developers to assure the
integrity of their users’ data and assets. They utilize Keyless
Signature Infrastructure (KSI) to generate signatures for
the resources [78]. KSI is a signature technique proposed
in 2006 exploiting hash trees and timestamps to construct
a signature for multiple documents. However, the original
proposal relied on a central authority to construct the tree and
give the signatures. Guardtime provides a blockchain-based
KSI approach which is scalable, decentralized, efficient
and provably secure. The Guardtime solution can be used
for the authentication as it was discussed in Section III or
for the integrity assurance. Ericsson utilizes Guardtime to
provide the integrity rather than the authentication. The basic
objective is to verify that a collection of the data generated by
an application has not been modified. The functions provided
by the service include generating a non-invertible signature
for the user’s data, extending the signature or publicizing it,
and verifying the integrity of the users’ data [79].
The Ericsson service involves two simple steps: signing the
data and verifying the signature. The signature of the data is
recognized by submitting them to the blockchain, where the
signature is simply sent back to the user. The signature is
stored in the blockchain transactions as well as at the user’s
system. To verify the data, the stored signature is submit-
ted to the blockchain network for verification purposes. The
blockchain nodes will validate the signature and return the
expected hash value if the signature is valid. The user com-
pares its hash value with the submitted one to determine
whether the data was modified [80].
This service is provided as an open-source software devel-
opment kit used by the application developers. It is currently
used in Ericsson cloud solution to provide immutable evidence
for the data stored in their clouds. This service is expected to
get more popular and adopted by other cloud providers to
provide a blockchain-based integrity assurance.
F. Summary
Data integrity assures that the data stored or transferred has
not been tampered. It is normally done by the cryptographic
signature combined with the verification techniques. In this
section, we discussed the data integrity assurance using the
blockchain technology and highlighted some blockchain-based
integrity assurance approaches. The blockchain technology by
itself can provide integrity assurance through non-repudiation
guarantees. Table XII compares the different approaches from
several perspectives. The Ericsson service verifies that a col-
lection of data has not been altered by storing their signature
on a blockchain.
It should be noted that none of the proposed approaches
guarantees tracking the intruders if the data has been changed.
Combining the proposed approaches with the data provenance
approaches discussed earlier can provide tracking of the data;
thus, it can detect who was the last changing the data.
TABLE XII
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INTEGRITY ASSURANCE
APPROACHES COMPARISON
VII. BLOCKCHAIN CHALLENGES
Despite the potential benefits of the blockchain technology,
it still has some challenges that limit its practicality for the
security applications discussed in the previous sections. In this
section, we highlight some of these challenges and relate them
to the security applications studied in this paper.
A. Privacy and Anonymity
One of the blockchain’s main properties and advantages is
providing pseudo-user anonymity. This is critical for security
as the public blockchains are open and the user information
would be exposed to attackers. However, for most of the dis-
cussed approaches, the transactions relate the user identity
to their public key, the ACL, or the provenance data. For
example, the blockchain-based ACL mechanisms relate the
ACL to the users directly; therefore, the users are no longer
anonymous. The same issue is applied to the blockchain-based
key management and blockchain-based provenance. That is,
the privacy and the anonymity features of the blockchains
are flawn. Bitcoin resolves the anonymity problem by using
the user’s public key as the user identification. However, this
provides pseudo-anonymity and further research is needed to
provide fully anonymized approaches that meet the security
application requirements.
B. Computations and Mining Nodes
In most of the current applications, the nodes are simple
and do not have high computational capabilities. That is, the
blockchain clients need to be simple in order to satisfy the low
computation capability requirements. On the other hand, the
security services, in general, require significant computations
in encryption, decryption, and signature. Moreover, as dis-
cussed in Section II, the blockchain technology needs to have
mining nodes with high computational power. For most of the
proposed techniques, the mining challenge would be resolved
by allowing the application nodes to be the blockchain clients
and by introducing dedicated mining nodes that are added just
to perform mining. However, the high computational power
required for these nodes adds to the cost of the system. A bet-
ter approach would include reducing the computational needs
for the mining and relating the mining powers to the node
trustworthiness or its reputation in the system. Further, sim-
pler cryptographic schemes can be developed to reduce the
computational needs for signing and encrypting the data.
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C. Communication Overhead
Current applications are highly dynamic; therefore, they
require frequent changes in the access lists and the prove-
nance data. This forces the nodes to send frequent transactions
to update the ACL or modify the provenance information. On
the other hand, the blockchain technology is a peer-to-peer
network, which indicates that a significant overhead will be
added in terms of the network traffic and the system process-
ing capabilities. The transactions and the blocks need to be
broadcast as opposed to unicast in the traditional techniques.
Thus, the overhead added to the network is significant and
a considerable challenge. The storage and the processing over-
head bring additional challenges in adopting the blockchains
for security applications.
D. Scalability
The blockchain technology is believed to scale better than
the traditional centralized techniques. However, as reported
in [82], the technology performs poorly as the number of users
and networking nodes increases [82]. This is a major chal-
lenge, especially with network security applications, where
thousands of users need to be served and the network scales
up fast. Furthermore, the dynamicity of the system adds to the
scaling problem as the nodes need to frequently send update
transactions. The Ethereum platform and the Hyperledger plat-
form have their own promises for scalability. However, the
performance tests done in [25] show that both platforms still
suffer from some aspects of scalability issues.
E. Time Consumption
Providing security services requires fast processing capabili-
ties, especially in the current networks, where milliseconds can
cost billions of dollars. Further, mining and achieving consen-
sus are still time-consuming in the blockchains. The proposed
approaches resolve the problem by making decisions from
the local blockchain logs without requiring distributed consen-
sus. For example, in the blockchain-based ACL mechanisms,
the access decisions are made based on the local copies of
the blockchain database. However, this defeats the technology
decentralized architecture and its consensus as the nodes need
to trust the local blockchain database and make centralized
decisions. Many promises have been made to resolve Bitcoin’s
time issues in Ethereum and Hyperledger platforms. However,
the time required for mining is still two or three seconds as
compared to the milliseconds requirement. Furthermore, build-
ing encryptions and security techniques over the blockchains
exacerbates the problem of time complexity since such tech-
niques are complex and time-consuming. Thus, faster mining
and processing techniques are needed to be able to employ the
blockchains for real-time applications.
F. Summary
The popularity of the blockchain technology in several
nonfinancial applications raised multiple challenges that we
discussed in this section. The discussed challenges are related
to providing security services and meeting the requirements of
the current applications. These challenges include privacy and
anonymity, computations and mining nodes, communication
TABLE XIII
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SECURITY APPLICATION
CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
overhead, scalability, and time consumption. Privacy and scala-
bility are the most difficult challenges, since they are related to
the blockchain-based security applications. A balance between
the technology potentials and the its challenges should be
considered for efficient designs and solutions. Table XIII sum-
marizes the blockchain-based security application challenges.
Till now, the blockchain technology does not seem to be
a potential candidate for real-time and delay-sensitive applica-
tions. Thus, the future research should tackle these challenges
for a practical and widespread use of the blockchain-based
security applications.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive survey
on the utilization of the blockchain technology in pro-
viding distributed security services. These services include
entity authentication, confidentiality, privacy, provenance, and
integrity assurances. The entity authentication and the con-
fidentiality can be achieved by the public key cryptography
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using encryption and the signature schemes. Thus, we dis-
cussed different blockchain-based key management for public
key cryptography. Further, privacy, provenance, and integrity
assurance services were studied each in separate sections.
We summarized on the properties that make the blockchain
technology a potential candidate for several distributed appli-
cations. Then, we defined each service, discussed its rules in
the current networking applications, highlighted the traditional
approaches achieving the required service along with their
challenges. Finally, we explained how the blockchains can help
resolve these problems; explored different blockchain-based
approaches and presented a comparison of such approaches.
At the end, we studied the challenges that are currently restrict-
ing the blockchain’s practicality for security applications. The
blockchain technology seems to have a great potential in many
applications; however, its practicality in security applications
is still questionable due to several challenges. Future research
directions include resolving these challenges and testing the
different blockchain approaches in large scale and real-time
environments.
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